




In the negotiations for EU enlargement, the deli-
cate matter of the free movement of labour is on
the agenda this year. As with past enlargements,
fears are prevalent within EU member states that
massive east-west migration will occur if the free
movement of labour is granted swiftly to the acces-
sion countries.The huge gap in standards of living,
the migration pressure that has built up, and the
critical situation in western European labour mar-
kets are the problems that must be dealt with.
Several estimates of the migration potential after
EU enlargement, as it affects Germany or western
Europe as a whole, have already been made. (See,
for example, Bauer and Zimmermann 1999,
European Integration Consortium 2000, or Sinn et
al. 2001). Public attention has focused on the pro-
jected migration volumes, which for Germany are
estimated at between two and six million people
over a fifteen year period. In the final analysis, the
problem is not the numbers involved, which are
very difficult to forecast,but existing economic and
legal factors that affect migration.
Special features of migration in Europe
Conventional economic migra-
tion theory is based on the
experience of countries with a
tradition of immigration such
as the United States, Canada,
Australia or New Zealand, but
European migration follows a
different pattern. In the above
countries, immigration is usual-
ly permanent, but within
Europe a large portion of
migrants can be seen as “com-
muters”.They differ only in the
frequency of their trips home,
which in some cases can be
daily or weekly but normally at
least several times a year. Most
migrants only work for several
years in the host country and then return to their
home countries,at the latest for retirement.Studies
of a migrant cohort in Germany show that after ten
years only 40% still live in Germany and after
25 years only 30%. The remainder has either
returned or is deceased.
Another special feature of migration within
Europe lies in the differing regulations with regard
to the migrants’ countries of origin. Whereas
migration from non-EU countries is strictly con-
trolled and limited, workers and their families
within the EU enjoy, in principle, free movement
across borders. Migration within the EU cannot be
directly controlled but depends solely on individ-
ual migration incentives like the relative income
situation, the state of the labour market, statutory
regulations as well as migration costs.
Advantages of the free movement of labour
From an economic point of view, good arguments
exist for the free movement of labour.With flexible
labour markets, free mobility ensures an efficient
distribution of labour in all countries of an enlarged
EU and increases GDP in the Union.The self-regu-
lation of the labour market continuously and opti-
mally adjusts the stock of migrants to the state of
economic development in the new member states.
Figure 1 shows that voluntary migration takes
place precisely to the degree that is advantageous
for both potential migrants and for the economies
involved. This fundamental correspondence
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between an individual and a social optimum arises
in a basic model which, for the purpose of simplifi-
cation, abstracts from all kinds of government
intervention.
Individual migration decisions are based primarily
on wage differentials between the home and host
countries, adjusted for the cost of travel and other
disadvantages that arise from living and working in
a foreign environment. Those whose wage advan-
tage is greater than the migration costs will
migrate, those for whom this is not the case will
stay at home. Insofar as the wage differential ade-
quately reflects the productivity lead of the host
country over the home country, free migration
leads to the best possible distribution of labour in
the countries involved, in the sense that the joint
GDP minus the migration costs is maximised. If
there are additional pecuniary migration incen-
tives,people will come who contribute less to value
added than is necessary to compensate for the loss
in value added of the home country and the migra-
tion costs. If administrative migration hurdles are
established,people will stay at home who would,in
the host country, create more value added than
necessary to compensate for the migration costs
and the loss of value added in the home country.
To the extent that labour productivity and wages in
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) increase with
progressing transformation and EU integration, the
incentive to work in western Europe will weaken
over time and the number of persons for whom wage
differences exceed the costs of commuting and living
abroad will also decline. For this reason, more and
more people will return to their home countries.
The conclusion to be drawn from these preliminary
considerations is that labour mobility is an impor-
tant element of an optimal strategy for system
transformation and EU integration of the CEE
countries, from which Germany and the other EU
countries can also profit (Sinn 2000). This basic
tenet must be kept in mind in the following sec-
tions when possible problems associated with the
granting of unrestricted movement of labour in the
EU are discussed.
Potential migration 
In a study for the Federal Ministry of Labour, the
Ifo Institute estimated the migration volume that
Germany might expect after EU enlargement, if
full mobility is granted immediately (Sinn et al.
2001, Chapter 1).The estimates were made for the
five largest accession countries (Poland, Romania,
the Slovak and Czech Republics, and Hungary).
The forecast was based on past experience with
migration that took place between 1974 and 1997
from Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain after south-
ern EU enlargement, and from Turkey.
The estimation was based on a panel analysis look-
ing at the determinants of previous migrations
both in a cross-section analysis and in longitudinal
perspective. The determinants include the follow-
ing variables:
• Income gap at purchasing power parity (mea-
sured in terms of the ratio of per capita GDP in
the home country to per capital GDP in
Germany);
• State of the labour market in Germany (repre-
sented by an “output gap”, see Flaig 2000);
• Network effects (measured by the stock of immi-
grants in the preceding period);
• Dummy variables for EU membership and,
independently, for the full mobility of labour.
A special feature of the approach is the primary
determination of the expected stock of immigrants
living in Germany, while annual migration flows
result from lagged adjustments to the determined
stocks. Thus, it takes into account the main differ-
ence between the Iberian migrations and the migra-
tions from eastern Europe:Behind the Iron Curtain
considerable migration pressure built up which still
has not weakened owing to the tightening of immi-
gration restrictions in the EU; migration during the
period of the Iberian dictatorships, however, was
unrestricted.This simple fact helps explain why the
2% to 3% of the population that migrated during
the southern EU expansion cannot be applied one-
to-one to forecast eastern European migration (see
Handelsblatt of 24 April 2001). Such a rule of
thumb approach is also meaningless because the
gap in real income (at purchasing power parities)
between the EU and the Iberian countries was only
30% in 1974 whereas today it is 60% with regard to
the five largest eastern European countries (55%
excluding Romania).
Figure 2 presents an overview of Ifo’s estimates of
eastern European potential migration to Germany.
The projections consider two scenarios in whichthe income gap to Germany either gradually
declines (relative income growth of 2%) or
remains constant (relative income growth of 0%).
The figure shows the projected stock of foreigners
of different nationalities living in Germany five,
ten, and fifteen years after EU enlargement with
immediate full mobility. After fifteen years these
stocks will increase from a current 500,000 persons
to an estimated 3.2 to 4 million persons.This corre-
sponds to a migrant ratio of about 4% to 5% of the
home country populations.
In addition, potential annual net immigration was
estimated with an otherwise strictly analogous
model. It yields the result that, in the first five
years after EU enlargement, an annual inflow of
about 200,000 to 250,000 migrants from the five
countries can be expected, followed by a gradual
decline in annual numbers. However, estimates of
the distribution of the projected stock effect over
the individual years are less reliable than estimates
of the stock effect itself.Actual migration will devi-
ate from these potentials partly because transition
periods for the granting of full mobility are being
considered and because the precise dates of EU
accession are not known.Also, in the final analysis,
all forecasts are hypothetical, an aspect often over-
looked in the public discussion.
In the meantime, Romania is not expected to be
among the first to be granted EU membership,part-
ly because of the migration potential. On the basis
of the recommendation of the European Com-
mission,announced after the release of the Ifo study
on 8 November 2000, up to eight countries will be
included in the first wave of EU membership:
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Czech Republic and Hungary.
Data is currently not available
to make explicit forecasts for
these countries. However, an
initial estimate is indeed possi-
ble since the countries not
explicitly included only com-
prise 15% of the population of
the eight countries. Disregard-
ing the results for Romania, on
the basis of our forecast
method, a total of between
3.4% and 4.3% of the popula-
tion of the acceding countries
will immigrate to Germany
during the first 15 years of EU membership if full
mobility is granted. If we multiply this by the popu-
lation of the eight accession candidates, the result is
a longer-term migration potential of 2.5 million to
3.3 million people. It is not exactly clear how these
numbers will be distributed over a 15-year period,
nor is it clear how they would be reduced in the case
of political restrictions.
A comparison with the DIW estimate
The Ifo forecast of the migration potential is high-
er than that forecasted by the German Institute for
Economic Research (DIW) (European Integration
Consortium 2000). The DIW results see migration
to Germany within a fifteen year period at
between 1.8% and 2.4% of the population of the
sending countries, and this forecast also includes
Bulgaria and Romania. How can the differences in
the two forecasts be explained?
The DIW forecast and the Ifo forecast use similar
data. In actual fact, an exchange of data between
the two institutes showed that the results are mutu-
ally replicable. The inclusion of Bulgaria in the
DIW study also does not explain the difference.
The difference can only be explained by the
methodology used in compiling and interpreting
the data and, in particular, by the different ways of
dealing with the cross-country and longitudinal
information (variation across countries vs. varia-
tion over time) that is contained in the data.
In contrast to the Ifo Institute, DIW used a fixed-
effects estimator which effectively eliminated
nearly all of the cross-country information when
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the coefficients for the forecast were calculated.
The remaining time series information produced
much lower coefficients for the influence of inter-
national differences on migration.The influence of
international income differences on the projected
migration flows was faded out of the picture (Flaig
2001).
The DIW approach would be more convincing if
the matter were one of predicting how an initial
migration level shrinks with the passage of time
when income in the accession country increases.
The result would be that the shrinkage is only
small and migration over a period of 15 years is
large. But this is not the question.
The more important issue is determining the
migration volume that can be expected from the
individual countries after EU membership and
granting of full mobility, and this is a question of
the anticipated cross-country effects. The DIW
attempts to estimate the cross-country effects sole-
ly with coefficients gained from the time-series
information. This is a methodological error. If
indeed any data could be suppressed in forecasting
the cross-country effects it would be the time-
series data but not the cross-country data them-
selves.
We can only speculate as to the economic reasons
for why the cross-country data generate much
lower coefficients than the time series data. A
plausible hypothesis relates to the old distinction
between longer term and cyclical (or permanent
and transitory) effects. Annual time series data
mostly reflect the cyclical effects, and these effects
are small since people rightly consider them to be
temporary. If, for example, a cyclical high and low
of Spanish income only led to slight changes in
migration behaviour, since the Spanish knew that
the income changes were only transitory, then the
result is,to be sure,a lower estimated coefficient in
the DIW method. However, it does not follow that
the income gap between Poland and Germany
after Poland joins the EU will induce only moder-
ate migration flows. But it is precisely this conclu-
sion that the DIW method produces, since the low
coefficient that is gained by observing the cyclical
fluctuations in incomes is used for estimating
migration from Poland.
Immigration from Poland depends on the antici-
pated longer-term income gap vis-à-vis Germany.
Longer-term differences, however, are especially
evident in the cross-country data since people
regard the differences from country to country as
more permanent than the differences between
boom and recession. In the estimation of the Ifo
Institute the size of the coefficient used in the fore-
cast is fully determined by the differences between
the countries, but in the DIW forecast these differ-
ences play only a minor role,apart from an indirect
effect that influences country-specific constants.1
The true problems of migration
In the public discussion, estimates of potential
migration are frequently regarded as threatening,
or – if low numbers are forecast – are received with
relief.Forecasts of high migration numbers are sus-
pected of supporting the political right whereas
low numbers have the smack of conformity with
positions of the left. Independent research, how-
ever, does not follow a political agenda. If an
econometric estimate produces high migration
numbers,this by no means implies that migration is
regarded as “too high”.
As long as migration is only induced by the inter-
national wage and productivity differences, and if
the labour markets of the host countries are suffi-
ciently flexible and receptive, the total welfare
effects of migration are positive. To be sure, redis-
tribution is touched off within the country of immi-
gration since at least in some labour market seg-
ments the competition for jobs increases, putting
downward pressure on wages. But capital income,
rents and wages for complementary types of work
increase (Sinn 1992; Borjas 1995). On balance, the
inhabitants of the host country always gain,and the
gains can theoretically be passed on to all affected.
However, if the conditions on which these welfare
gains depend are examined more closely,two prob-
lem areas become evident:
• Firstly, the German and Continental European
labour markets are not very flexible for a num-
1 As an illustration, note that according to the DIW approach the
long-term rate of immigration to be expected from eastern Europe
to Germany is only around 2% of the domestic population.This is
lower than the current stock of immigrants from Greece (3.5%) or
Turkey (3.4% or, if corrected for naturalisations, 3.7%).The latter
example is particularly telling since the estimates for the accession
countries relate to a situation of unrestricted labour mobility,while
there is no free movement for potential migrants from Turkey.ber of reasons, and their ability to adjust could
be overtaxed by large-scale immigration.
• Secondly, the redistribution measures of west-
ern European social welfare states, with their
tax-financed social benefits and their extensive
supply of public goods, artificially increase the
incentives to migrate.
Inflexible labour markets
Western European labour markets are still suffering
from high unemployment. Especially in the case of
relatively rapid immigration of a large number of
additional workers,there is the risk that these work-
ers will partially only crowd out some of the
presently employed as a result of the low flexibility
of wages.The reduced GDP of the home countries is
then not offset by increased value added in the host
country, and the migration costs that occur are eco-
nomically wasted. In addition, domestic workers
who lose their jobs, have – because of claims to
unemployment benefits – little incentive to return
to employment and to contribute to a clearing of the
labour market at lower wages.
The key to solving this problem lies in the host coun-
tries.The general, and by no means new, recommen-
dation is that the labour markets’ ability to adjust
must be enhanced (see OECD 1994; European
Commission 1998; Sinn et al. 2001, Chapter 2.6).
First,a precise analysis of the actual causes of labour
market inflexibility is required, the usual suspects
being: systems of collective bargaining, labour mar-
ket regulation,and/or unfavourable incentives of the
social-welfare system. Consequently, the agenda for
reform would include more
decentralised wage agreements,
changes in dismissal protection
laws and other labour market
institutions as well as a reform
of unemployment and welfare
benefits which should be
geared more to a welfare-to-
work idea than to rewarding
non-employment. In any case,
efforts are needed, prior to EU
enlargement, to make the
labour markets more flexible.
If the remaining time for this is
not sufficient, and provided
that the risk of job displace-
ment of domestic workers were
the only problem involved in
granting free movement of labour,a transition phase
with temporary constraints on the migration volume
would be the only alternative. However, such a
dirigiste approach would only be a second-best solu-
tion compared to swift reform of the labour market
and the immediate granting of free labour mobility.
Migration incentives from public redistribution 
In the second problem area – the artificial migra-
tion incentives given by the redistributing social-
welfare state – things are more complicated.
Figure 3 shows that the volume of migration is too
high from an economic point of view when
migrants profit from the redistribution that is prac-
tised in the host country.Here,the migrants’ “fiscal
balance” must be examined, i.e. the sum of social
benefits received and the equivalent of all state-
provided or financed infrastructure goods minus
all financial contributions in the form of taxes and
social insurance charges. If this fiscal balance is
positive,the effective wage of the migrants exceeds
the labour costs and the individual gain from
migration is higher than the gain for the economy.
Corrected for the migration costs, the additional
migrants that would be attracted in comparison to
the optimum amount create a lower GDP in the
host country than they would have in their home
country.A marginal welfare loss is the result.
In practice, the problem is usually such that
migrants initially work in low-skilled jobs. They
earn below-average incomes for a number of years
until they have assimilated and reached the aver-
age wage. Since migrants pay relatively low taxes
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during this phase but participate in full measure in
the tax-financed state spending, they profit from
the redistribution of resources from the wealthy to
the poor that characterises the tax and transfer sys-
tems in western European states.
In the short term this leads to an excessive and,
above all, distorted migration volume. Since the
artificial element of economic migration incen-
tives is the stronger the lower the migrant’s mar-
ket wage, it is precisely the less qualified who are
more strongly attracted. Conversely, the natural,
wage-inherent migration incentives for the highly
qualified are reduced since they earn above-aver-
age incomes and must therefore give the state
more in the form of taxes and contributions than
they get back in the form of public goods and
other services.
In the long term, with large migration flows, con-
siderable fiscal burdens can result which encour-
age the host country to dismantle its social welfare
system so as not to become the target of further
migration flows. The danger of an erosion of the
western European social welfare state, even
threatening redistribution measures that are at the
heart of government responsibility, cannot be dis-
missed.2
The magnitude of the problem can be assessed by
drawing up a “fiscal balance”of previous migration
to Germany, which for persons with a relatively
short stay clearly shows a migration premium in
addition to the wage differential. The results of a
detailed calculation for all major categories of the
German tax and transfer system are shown in the
table below.The figures are based on data from the
Socio-Economic Panel as well as calculations of
the Ifo Institute (Sinn et al. 2001, Chapter 4).They
show present values for social insurance contribu-
tions and benefits, tax payments and tax-financed
transfers as well as other state transfers.
During the first ten years immigrants in Germany
enjoy an average net fiscal advantage of ca.
Euro 2,300 a year. As expected, this benefit
declines as the stay lengthens.
Whoever lives twenty-five
years or longer in Germany
pays the state Euro 850 more
per year than he receives in
benefits. These results show
that, from the standpoint of the
immigrant who stays a short
time, which is typical for
European migration, the fiscal
net balance is indeed positive,
as was assumed in Figure 3.The
results confirm (for the past)
that, even with the numerous
special regulations for foreign-
ers qualifying for social bene-
fits, there is an artificially
enhanced incentive to immi-
grate to Germany and an incen-
tive for the German govern-
ment to reduce the generosity
of its welfare system.
a) Numbers in this table only reflect the relative position of a migrant who was living in west
Germany in 1997. A direct transference to the expected migrants from central and eastern
Europe is not possible since the structure of future migrant cohorts is likely to be different
from the migration stock of 1997.
b) Migrants in Germany are persons with non-German nationality, persons whose mother is
of non-German nationality, and persons who have been naturalised in Germany; it does not
include ethnic Germans who have immigrated from eastern Europe and Russia.
c) Present value of future benefit entitlements (implicit public debt)
d) Transfers to private households and average costs of the provision of public goods.
Direct Fiscal Impact of Immigrationa)b)
– West Germany 1997 –
2 It is irrelevant whether government-
organised redistribution is understood
here as the expression of special redis-
tributive preferences over which there is
public consensus or whether they are
interpreted as the result of a general effi-
ciency-enhancing insurance of risks with
regard to life-time income, insurance that
cannot (or not completely) be offered by
the market (Sinn 1995; 1996).
Source: Sinn et al. (2001).
c)
c)
d)The solution: Selectively delayed integration into
the social welfare system
The traditional western European-style welfare
state is incompatible with the free mobility of
labour and immediate inclusion of immigrants in
the host country’s welfare programmes. Since each
state will attempt to discourage net recipients of
state transfers and to attract net contributors, the
foundations of the welfare state are eroded.
Competition among social-welfare states is a
dumping competition,which,if it is allowed to take
place, will lead to the loss of the social achieve-
ments of western Europe.
The American example shows the dangers quite
clearly.In the United States,freedom and inclusion
are guaranteed and government is strongly decen-
tralised.As a result, social-welfare structures along
European lines have not been able to develop. In
the early 1970s, the generous social benefits grant-
ed in New York City proved to be a welfare mag-
net to the low-skilled and, after the city nearly
went bankrupt in 1974, had to be scaled back. A
similar phenomenon occurred in California in the
1990s.
In order to protect the welfare state from the ero-
sive forces of competition among countries, either
the free movement of labour or inclusion must be
restricted.3 The Ifo Institute considers the free
movement of labour to be the more important
legal principle and hence recommends a moderate,
temporary weakening of the inclusion principle.
To prevent artificial migration incentives and a
competition of deterrence measures, the net fiscal
balance of immigrants that stay for short periods of
time must be equalised. This does not impede the
long-term integration of the immigrants and it does
not imply the full exclusion of the immigrants from
the tax and transfer system of the host country.
Such a radical step cannot be considered for the
simple fact that most of the infrastructure provided
by the state is freely accessible and because the
association agreements between the EU and the
accession candidates call for an inclusion in the
contribution-financed benefits of the welfare state.
A possible and sufficient way to equalise the fiscal
balance is to delay the granting of selected tax-
financed social benefits.This includes supplemental
social assistance, housing benefits, and qualification
for public housing. Another possibility is prohibit-
ing the “export”of family benefits to children living
in the home country. This has been suggested by
Sinn et al. (2001), and, similarly, by the Scientific
Council to the German Ministry of Finance (2001).
The key to solutions of this nature, however, lies at
the European level. Current law on the free move-
ment of EU labour is supplemented by co-ordinat-
ing EU social law, whose overarching principle is
the non-discrimination of migrants vis-à-vis the
native-born population. In EU law and subsequent
court rulings, this principle has always been inter-
preted such that – with some differentiation with
regard to the tax and contribution-financed sys-
tems – the regulations of the country of employ-
ment primarily determine the social rights of
migrants and commuters, including an “export”
provision for some social benefits for dependants
still living in the home country. Fears of increased
migration in the case of previous EU enlargements
were dealt with by introducing transitional regula-
tions that restricted the overarching right of free
movement. Whoever wanted to migrate received
the full status of an EU migrant employee, but
many who wanted to migrate were not allowed to
enter. They were faced with a maximum of dis-
crimination.
There are no precedents in European law for selec-
tively delayed integration of migrants from the
accession countries into the western European
social systems but there are also no insurmount-
able barriers. In the current accession negotiations,
this idea has not yet been discussed. There are
good reasons for considering this approach, how-
ever, also with regard to the traditions and inten-
tions of European integration. Past transitional
regulations, which permitted temporary quotas for
migrants from acceding countries, are too strong a
limitation of the freedom of movement guaranteed
by the Treaty of Rome and also mean foregoing
possible integration gains. The alternative pro-
posed here will lead to a considerably weaker lim-
itation of personal civil rights. Anyone who wants
to is free to come but receives no hand-outs. This
will permit a more rapid transition to the com-
pletely free movement of labour and will result in
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3 Harmonisation of social benefits in Europe is not possible at the
moment because of the considerable income differentials.
Harmonised social benefits, which seem appropriate for the richer
European countries, would implement high minimum wages in the
weaker countries whose consequence would be mass unemploy-
ment. This would create many Mezzogiorni in Europe. See Sinn
and Westermann (2000).CESifo Forum 47
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an efficient self-selection of potential migrants,
which is necessary to achieve maximum welfare
gains. Dirigiste solutions to the migration problem
are not needed in Europe.
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